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Who Killed the Inner Circle? The Decline of the American Corporate Interlock Network 
 
ABSTRACT 
U.S. corporations shared members of their boards of directors since the early 1900s, creating a 
dense interlock network in which nearly every major corporation and director was connected 
through short paths and elevating a handful of well-connected directors to an influential “inner 
circle.” This network remained highly-connected throughout the 20th century, serving as a 
mechanism for the rapid diffusion of information and practices, as well as a device for promoting 
elite cohesion. Some of the most well-established findings in the sociology of networks spring 
from this milieu. In the 2000s, however, board recruiting practices changed: well-connected 
directors became less preferred, and due to this shift in preference, the inner circle disappeared 
and companies are less connected to each other. Revisiting three classic studies on the diffusion 
of corporate policies, on corporate executives’ political unity, and on elite socialization, we find 
that established understandings of the effects of board interlocks on U.S. corporations, their 
directors, and social elites no longer hold. 
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In the century after Louis Brandeis published Other Peoples’ Money in 1914, the U.S. corporate 
interlock network became perhaps the most studied network in the social sciences. Brandeis 
argued that a handful of bankers were able to dominate the corporate economy through positions 
as directors on the boards of their subject companies, creating an “endless chain” that served as 
“the most potent instrument of the Money Trust.” Mills (1956) described how a power elite knit 
together business, government, and the military. Mintz and Schwartz (1985) showed that 
financial institutions held enduring positions at the apex of the network, while Useem (1984) 
uncovered the distinctive psychology and class consciousness of well-connected directors, whom 
he labeled the “inner circle.” Dozens of studies since then have shown the potency of this 
network for diffusing ideas, promoting common corporate practices, and enabling coordinated 
action (Mizruchi, 1996; Dreiling and Darves, 2011).  
Throughout the 20th century, the network had several enduring properties. While the vast 
majority of directors served on only one board, an elite group of a few dozen people—the inner 
circle—served on many boards. Similarly, a handful of corporations maintained large boards 
staffed with well-connected directors that gave them a distinct status as hubs of the network. As 
a result of these two features, the average geodesic, or shortest network distance, between any 
pair of directors or any pair of companies was remarkably short; that is, the network was a small 
world (Watts, 1999). 90.9% of large corporations were within three steps of the most-central 
board in 1904 (Mizruchi, 1982); the comparable figure in 1999 was 82.4%. A flu virus that 
infected the J.P. Morgan Chase board in January 2001 could have spread to 80% of the Fortune 
1000 by May through monthly board meetings (Davis, Yoo and Baker, 2003). 
All this has changed since the turn of the 21st century. In 1974, more than 90 directors served on 
five or more major corporate boards in the U.S. In 1994, at least 75 people held five board seats. 
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By 2012, there was only one director serving on five S&P 500 boards: Shirley Ann Jackson, 
president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The inner circle had vanished. Moreover, because 
the number of intercorporate connections rises geometrically with board memberships – five 
people who each serve on two boards create only five connections, while one person who serves 
on five boards creates ten – these well-connected directors were especially consequential for the 
overall density of the network. Without an inner circle, the shortest paths between firms grow 
much longer. A large body of work premised on densely-connected corporate boards may no 
longer be applicable in the United States (cf. Mizruchi, 1996). 
In this article, we describe macrostructural changes in the U.S. corporate interlock network from 
1997 to 2010, explain why these changes occurred, and outline their implications. We document 
the decline of some of the most enduring properties of the network since the turn of the 21st 
century. Using comprehensive time-series data on over 27,000 directors serving on almost 2,500 
corporate boards in the U.S., we analyze both the dynamics of tie creation and dissolution and 
the aggregate properties of the resulting network. Our findings show that the inner circle, a 
durable feature of the U.S. corporate landscape over the 20th century, has disappeared, and 
distances between companies on the interlock network have lengthened to unprecedented levels. 
Regression and simulation analysis provides evidence that the cause of these changes was the 
breakdown of a process of preferential attachment. During the 20th century, well-connected 
directors who already served on multiple corporate boards were substantially more likely to gain 
new appointments than those who served on only one board; in short, the rich in board seats got 
richer. Since the turn of the 21st century, however, well-connected, multi-boarded directors have 
lost their advantage. This change had important consequences for the aggregate structure of the 
network. 
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We then illustrate the implications of a less-connected network on the effects of board ties, by 
verifying whether three well-established findings in the literature still hold true. First, we find 
that introductions from existing multi-board directors (Useem, 1984) no longer create a viable 
pathway to the corporate interlock network inner circle. There is no cohesive, far-reaching inner 
circle left to join, and re-creating one would be effectively impossible given current director 
hiring practices. Second, simulations show that the political unifying power of the interlock 
network (Mizruchi, 1992; Burris, 2005) is weakened, and the prospects for broad-based, 
moderate political action by corporate elites are lowered. Third, we show that multiple interlock 
ties to prior adopters (Davis, 1991) can no longer explain diffusion of practices across the 
network. Rapid, broad-based diffusion of new corporate practices, if it still occurs, happens 
through other mechanisms. 
The U.S. corporate elite network 
Corporate board interlocks are perhaps the most-studied network in the social sciences. In his 
analysis of early 20th century capitalism, Lenin (1939 [1916]) drew on Jeidels’ 1905 study of 
bank interlocks in Germany to portray intrinsic tendencies toward the concentration of economic 
power. Brandeis (1914) echoed this theme in his description of early finance capitalism in the 
U.S., where a few bankers served on dozens of corporate boards. Generations of scholars have 
since investigated interlock networks in economies around the world (e.g., Mintz and Schwartz, 
1985; Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott, 1985; Scott, 1997; Windolf, 2002). More recent 
cross-national comparisons show that countries vary widely in the structural properties of their 
interlock networks, both cross-sectionally and over time (Kogut, 2012).  
What is at stake is how we understand the social structure of corporate control. The earliest work 
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on board interlocks took for granted that demonstrating the existence of a well-connected social 
elite was sufficient to show that it mattered. Mills (1956: 283) stated, “The key organizations, 
perhaps, are the major corporations themselves, for on the boards of directors we find a heavy 
overlapping among the members of these several elites.” And: “We must remember that these 
men of the power elite now occupy the strategic places in the structure of American society; that 
they command the dominant institutions of a dominant nation; that, as a set of men, they are in a 
position to make decisions with terrible consequences for the underlying populations of the 
world” (286-7). An early agenda for studying elites was to highlight just how small the world of 
these elites was through shared affiliations such as board memberships.  
By the late 1980s, sociologists moved beyond simply showing that interlocks were common to 
tracing their effects on corporate behavior. The political action committees of companies whose 
executives served on the same bank boards donated to similar candidates, suggesting that 
interlocks were a mechanism for political cohesion (Mizruchi, 1989; 1992). Contentious 
corporate governance practices quickly spread from board to board through shared directors, 
indicating that the network was a substrate for diffusion (Davis, 1991). Dozens of subsequent 
studies showed shared directorships to be a pervasive influence on board-level decisions: perhaps 
unsurprisingly, what directors experienced on one board shaped what they did on other boards 
(see Mizruchi, 1996, for an early review). 
The aggregate effect of these dyadic ties depends on the shape of the larger network in which 
they are embedded. A virus can spread faster in midtown Manhattan than in an archipelago, and 
practices that diffuse through a dense network of shared directors can spread faster than those 
that diffuse through sparse geographic networks (Davis and Greve, 1997). Moreover, 
communities with dense local corporate networks are better able to mobilize than those without, 
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whether to lobby the state legislature for favorable policies (Vogus and Davis, 2005), to support 
local nonprofits (Marquis, Davis, and Glynn, 2013), or to launch a successful Olympics bid, as 
Atlanta’s well-connected business elite did (Glynn, 2008). At the national level, students of elites 
have seen a dense corporate network as perhaps the most important mechanism for 
coherent—often politically moderate and pragmatic—political action on the part of business 
(Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 2013). By implication, its absence could undermine the possibility of 
class conscious elites. That is, the macrostructure of the network is essential for many of the 
network’s effects. 
The interlock network has several distinctive features that shape how we understand it. In 
contrast to many social networks, where actors choose their partners directly, interlocks are 
created indirectly via affiliations. Companies connect to other companies as a by-product of their 
choice of directors who serve on other boards. Yet unlike many affiliation networks, interlocks 
are strong ties. As Grannis (2010) points out, the network among sociology departments created 
through faculty hiring (or the network among actors who appeared in the same film at some point 
in their careers) lacks plausible mechanisms for two-way communication. Board meetings, in 
contrast, effectively ensure regular face-to-face contact between directors and two-way 
communications between connected companies. Day-long board meetings every month or two 
create a powerful substrate for diffusion. 
Finally, interlocks are a network both of people and of corporations (Breiger, 1974). The agenda 
for work on both aspects of the network was set in the 1980s. As a network of people, 
researchers focused on the careers of directors and how the inner circle was comprised and 
operated. Useem (1984) found members of the inner circle to be a distinct social type who were 
prone to being involved both in the business world and in public service. Over the course of two 
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decades, Westphal and co-authors have analyzed in detail the career paths of directors and the 
factors that led some types to gather many board appointments in the U.S. (Westphal and Zajac, 
2013). Perhaps the central question here is, What distinguishes those directors who become 
super-connectors serving on a large number of boards? Super-connectors are few in number but 
disproportionately consequential in their effect on the structure of the network. A director 
serving on two boards creates one tie (between companies A and B), and a director serving on 
three boards creates three ties (between A and B, B and C, and A and C). But a director serving 
on nine boards, as Vernon Jordan did for much of the 1980s and 1990s, creates 36 dyadic ties 
among companies (and over 4,000 two-step ties between directors). 
As a network of corporations, research focused largely on the status ordering among 
companies—which kinds of companies became central, and why. Mintz and Schwartz (1985) 
found that money center banks comprised a stable core for the U.S. interlock network due to 
their position in the flow of capital in the economy. Early in the century, bank centrality 
stemmed from ties created through the appointment of bankers to corporate boards. By the 1960s, 
banks instead gained their centrality by appointing to their own board well-connected outside 
directors, such as the CEOs of prominent companies. Subsequently, Davis and Mizruchi (1999) 
found that bank boards had shrunk in size and in their recruiting of well-connected directors, and 
no single type of company monopolized the most central positions. Centrality no longer reliably 
mapped onto capital flows. Despite these shifts in the identity of the most central companies, the 
network as a whole remained highly-connected, with short path lengths connecting almost all 
directors and companies, as a result of the continued existence of a highly-connected core of 
directors (Davis et al., 2003). 
Corporate governance and challenges to the interlock network since 2000 
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For almost the whole of the 20th century, the distribution of board memberships was highly 
skewed. While thousands of directors served on only one board, and hundreds on two or three, a 
few dozen sat on five or more, and a handful on eight or more. A highly skewed distribution held 
at the dawn of the corporate age at the beginning of the 20th century (Mizruchi, 1982), in the 
1930s and1940s (Mills, 1956: p. 383, footnote 12), and at the end of the century (Davis et al., 
2003). The existence of an inner circle was an enduring feature of the U.S. corporate landscape, 
even as particular directors and companies came and went and as the kinds of people occupying 
central positions shifted from bankers to corporate executives to prominent figures from the 
non-profit and academic worlds. 
The two key properties of the network – the presence of an inner circle and short path lengths 
(geodesics) connecting directors and companies – are mathematically related. Super-connectors 
have a vastly disproportionate impact on the network’s macrostructure, increasing its density 
(percentage of potential ties realized) and shrinking its average geodesic. One super-connector 
serving on ten boards creates 45 unique ties among corporations, as much as 15 directors who 
serve on three boards each, or 45 directors serving on two boards each. Thus, the presence of an 
inner circle of super-connectors is critical for creating a densely-connected network. 
The existence of an inner circle reflects the recruiting practices of boards: some directors are 
attractive to many kinds of boards and have the opportunity to become super-connectors. 
Previous studies of the corporate interlock network suggested different bases for preferential 
recruitment. One basis is broadly demographic: directors are attractive due to their background, 
education, race, or gender. A second basis is network dynamics: certain directors are advantaged 
either because of the processes that boards used when searching for new directors or because of 
the criteria that boards used to evaluate director candidates. First, a director who served on many 
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boards had many co-directors who could provide personal recommendations for new board 
appointments
1
. Second, sitting on many boards in itself increased the value of a director for new 
board appointments. Useem (1984) argued that directors sitting on many boards gained 
broad-based business intelligence, social connections, and legitimacy within the corporate and 
political worlds, thus making them attractive as co-directors. Companies encouraged their best 
executives to serve on outside boards to gain access to these network benefits. Moreover, there is 
reason to expect that directors convey status to their boards via the other boards on which they 
serve. Among the few pieces of information that shareholders learn about directors during their 
annual election is what other boards they serve on. For instance, a bank whose directors serve on 
many other well-known corporate boards gains the implicit endorsement of these firms (Davis 
and Robbins, 2005). 
Any of these rules of attachment—widely-shared preferences based on demography or network 
positions—could yield a distribution of board memberships in which a few directors end up on 
many boards. This is in most cases sufficient to yield a small world network (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999; Watts, 1999). Thus, the disappearance of the inner circle suggests that the rules of 
attachment changed around the turn of the 21st century.  
We examine changes in the rules of attachment, that is, the characteristics that made directors 
more or less likely to join new boards, to ascertain the causes of the demise of the inner circle. 
We focus on demography and network dynamics. For most of the 20th century, boards were 
comprised almost exclusively of white men, typically executives with elite pedigrees. This 
changed somewhat during the 1980s and 1990s, and boards came to contain more non-executives 
                                                          
1
 In almost all the instances where Vernon Jordan gained another board seat, he had previously served on another 
board with at least one director on the new board (Davis at al., 2003: 304). 
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and became modestly more diverse. Given that boards prefer to recruit those with whom at least 
one director is acquainted, one of the results of this new-found preference for diversity was that a 
small handful of women and minority directors each joined a large number of boards: once such 
a director joined one board, he or she was in a position to be invited onto several more. By 2002, 
Forbes
2
 magazine reported that four of the five best-connected directors on S&P 500 boards 
were African-American.  
Studies also showed that boards preferred to recruit sought-after directors who already served on 
many other boards, especially if the companies on whose boards they served were successful 
(Davis and Robbins, 2005). A board’s status is transmitted in part by its affiliations (Bothner, 
Smith, and White, 2010), which suggests that directors of prominent and successful firms would 
be preferred. 
This process can work in reverse, however: directors (and, by association, their firms) can be 
tainted by their affiliations (Sullivan,Haunschild, and Page, 2007). In the wake of corporate 
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere in the early 2000s, directors’ other 
affiliations—even with firms lauded for their performance and innovation—could be hazardous 
to a firm’s prestige. Directors became subject to increased scrutiny through the publication of 
“report cards” by outside evaluators, where directors serving on multiple boards faced greater 
hazards of downgrades (e.g., due to earnings restatements). Moreover, simply serving on several 
boards in itself came to be seen as prima facie evidence of inattention. Rather than being a sign 
of status and talent, service on multiple boards was classified by many as a sign of being 
stretched too thin, or “overboarded.” Institutional Shareholder Services, an influential firm that 
advises institutional investors on how to vote their shares at the annual meetings where directors 
                                                          
2
 Forbes. 2002. America’s most overworked directors. (http://www.forbes.com/2002/08/06/0806directors.html)  
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are elected, codified this diagnosis. Beginning with the 2004 proxy season, ISS began 
recommending that votes be withheld for directors who served on more than six public company 
boards. For CEOs, the recommended limit on number of boards was reduced to three (including 
their own firm). As of this writing, the policy stands at a maximum of six boards
3
. What is 
perhaps remarkable is that at the time the policy was enacted, it applied to fewer than ten 
individuals (of whom at least five were African-American), none sitting on more than seven 
boards. A six-board maximum would have only limited influence on the existence of an inner 
circle.  
But the new policy’s real significance is that it indicated a reversal of the valuation of being 
well-connected. As we have noted, for decades well-connected directors were highly sought after 
for their experience, connections, and legitimating potential. Our discussions with veteran 
directors and corporate counsel suggest that this preference for well-connected directors has 
reversed.  
In some cases the new standards are codified in corporate policies that limit the number of 
boards on which directors can serve. Bank of America’s current corporate governance guidelines 
state: 
“To ensure that directors have sufficient time to properly discharge their duties, directors 
are expected to seek Corporate Governance Committee approval prior to joining the 
board of any other public company. No director shall serve on the boards of more than 
six public companies, including the Company’s Board.” (emphasis added, here and in 
quotes below) 
General Motors’ standards say: 
                                                          
3
 The current policy is available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/1_2015-us-summary-voting-guidelines-updated.pdf on page 15. 
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“It is the expectation of the Board that every member have sufficient time to commit to 
preparation for and attendance at Board and committee meetings. Therefore, it is the 
sense of the Board that non-employee directors should not serve on more than four 
other boards of publicly traded companies (excluding non-profits and subsidiaries) 
unless the Board determines that such service will not impair the ability of such director 
to effectively perform his or her obligations as a director of the Company.” 
And Altria’s standards state: 
“Each director is expected to ensure that other commitments do not interfere with the 
discharge of his or her duties as a director of the Company. Consequently, directors 
should not serve on more than three other public company boards. Directors are 
expected to inform the Chairman and the Chair of Nominating, Corporate Governance 
and Social Responsibility Committee upon becoming a director of any other public 
company or becoming a member of the audit committee of any other public company.” 
The number of allowable board memberships varies – six for Bank of America directors, five for 
GM directors (with the option for a waiver), four for Altria directors – but what is significant is 
that firms have any stated policies limiting the number of directorships, something that was 
almost unheard-of before 2001. 
Data sources 
In the following sections, we begin by describing changes in the macro-structure of the U.S. 
board interlock network from 1997 to 2010. We then determine whether these structural changes 
can be explained by changes in the preference for well-boarded, well-connected directors, by 
first identifying shifts in board hiring patterns, and then using Monte Carlo simulations to 
ascertain whether these shifts were sufficient to cause the interlock network’s observed 
macro-structural changes. 
For these investigations, we created a dataset covering S&P 1500 boards from 1997 to 2010 
inclusive, using data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS; formerly RiskMetrics), 
Boardex, and CRSP/Compustat. Annual board composition data were created using board data 
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from ISS/RiskMetrics and interlock data from Boardex. While the ISS/RiskMetrics dataset is the 
one most commonly used in studies of board interlocks, it suffers from issues of data quality. 
Names are listed inconsistently, different people with the same name or similar names are 
sometimes indicated as being the same person, and the same person is often listed using several 
“unique” identifiers. The Boardex dataset uses company and director unique identifiers 
consistently. (During data processing, we found only one instance of an identifier being used 
inconsistently in Boardex, compared to thousands of inconsistencies in ISS/RiskMetrics.) 
Boardex has its own weaknesses, however. The data coverage is incomplete for firms and 
individuals that were not active into the late 2000s and Boardex sometimes splits one company 
into two entries. 
We corrected ISS/RiskMetrics company and director identifiers by matching them to Boardex 
identifiers, using text similarity matching for company and director names, director board lists 
and company director lists, and pattern-matching for interlocks. We created algorithms to 
automatically generate suggested corrections to ISS/RiskMetrics data based on linked Boardex 
data. Suggested corrections were manually checked before being reflected in the final dataset. 
Using this corrected data set, we created the list of companies that were on the S&P 1500 as of 
their annual meeting date according to ISS/RiskMetrics, and generated the corresponding lists of 
board members. We added annual performance data from CRSP/Compustat, matching entries on 
CUSIPs and ticker symbols. For supplemental analyses of the effect of shareholder proposals on 
director hiring, we used the ISS/RiskMetrics Shareholder Proposals dataset, matching on 
company name. 
The S&P 1500 sample includes 2,454 distinct companies and 17,065 company-years, and 27,192 
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directors and 151,135 director-years. From these lists of companies and boards, we created lists 
of annual board interlocks (companies sharing a director) and director interlocks (directors 
serving together on the same board). The sample consisted of 54,220 corporate interlock-years 
for an average of slightly under 3,900 interlocks per year, and 882,120 director interlock-years 
for an average of slightly over 63,000 interlocks per year. 
The collapse of connectedness in the interlock network 
Figure 1 shows mean geodesics in the main component of the corporate interlock network 
connecting the largest U.S. public companies. Average network distances stayed near constant 
between 1982 and 1999 (Davis et al., 2003), but increased sharply from 2000 to 2010 (this study). 
The average distance between two companies in the main component of the S&P 500 corporate 
interlock network increased from 3.21 in 2000 to 4.23 in 2010, while the S&P 1500 mean 
geodesic increased from 4.16 to 4.97 during the same period. Table 1 lists the sizes of the 
maximal three-step networks in the large U.S. public company network for selected years from 
1904 to 2010. Like the most-central companies over the previous 100 years, the company with 
the largest three-step network in 2000 (Sara Lee) had board ties linking it to over 80% of S&P 
500 boards in three steps, and none of the 425 S&P 500 main component companies were more 
than five steps away from Sara Lee on the corporate interlock network. By contrast, in 2010 
United Technologies Company had the largest three-step network, but had barely more than 60% 
of S&P 500 boards linked within three steps, and it required eight steps to reach all companies in 
the main component from United Technologies. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The decreased connectedness in the interlock network (figure 2) was caused by 1) decreased 
numbers of direct ties from companies to companies, and 2) changes in the distribution of 
number of ties from companies to companies and directors to directors. The average degree for 
companies in the S&P 1500 corporate interlock network decreased from 7.14 in 2000 to 4.98 in 
2010. There were 62 companies with more than 20 direct board ties (shared directors) to other 
companies in 2000 with Sara Lee and Allstate having 37 direct ties each. By 2010, only one 
company with more than 20 direct ties remained—Marathon Oil with only 21. (See table 2 for a 
list of the most-connected companies and their number of shared-director ties to other companies 
in 2000 and 2010.) The average degree for directors (number of directors sharing boards with the 
focal director) declined from 12.32 to 10.95, a smaller drop as the modal director continued to 
serve on one board with eight to ten other directors. The connectedness of the most-connected 
directors decreased dramatically, however. In 2000, Vernon Jordan served on boards with 101 
different S&P 1500 directors. By 2010, the most-connected director (Sam Nunn) had only 53 
direct ties. (See figure 2 for company and director degree distributions. See table 3 for a list of 
the most-connected directors and their number of same-board ties to other directors in 2000 and 
2010.) In 2000, 71 directors had more than 50 direct ties; by 2010 only five directors had more 
than 50 ties. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 2 about here 
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------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 3 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
These decreases in average connectedness were driven by the disappearance of 
super-connectors—directors who sat on many boards simultaneously. In 2000, 17 directors each 
sat on six or more S&P 1500 boards (Vernon Jordan was on nine) and 44 sat on five. By 2010, 
no directors sat on six or more boards and only 11 sat on five (see figure 4). The median age for 
super-connectors in 2000 was five years higher (64) than the median age for all directors, 
suggesting that super-connector attrition due to age and retirement could explain one part of the 
decline in network connectivity. Figure 5 plots the age of directors with six or more board seats 
in 2001 versus the net number of board seats each of these directors lost over the next eight years, 
and shows a strong linear relationship (t = 4.76, p = 0.001). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 4 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
------------------------------------------ 
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Insert figure 5 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
Declining preference for well-boarded, well-connected directors 
The question still remained as to what precluded the appearance of new super-connectors to 
replace those who retired. To answer this question we examined over-time changes in what kinds 
of directors were more likely to gain another board seat in the subsequent year. Our first measure 
was the number of board seats held by the focal director—how well-boarded the director was. 
We also used a measure of network reach for each director—the logged4 number of boards that 
each director could be introduced to by his peer directors. To construct this director-year 
measure, we calculated the number of boards that were directly linked to the focal director’s 
current boards and on which the focal director did not currently serve. 
We examined the effect of several different director characteristics beyond being well-boarded 
and well-connected. Demographically, we tagged directors who were female, members of an 
ethnic minority, or members of the social elite (which we defined as non-minority men educated 
at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, or Stanford). We also tracked whether each director was a corporate 
executive for each year of our study period. We also controlled for directors’ age and 
age-squared in our regressions. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that skilled directors were good stewards of shareholder value, 
and that such directors would be rewarded with more remunerative, high-profile board seats. 
While it is impossible to directly measure director skill, several studies (e.g., Yermack, 2004) 
found that directors of firms with good performance tended to join more boards, as did directors 
                                                          
4
 We added 1 to the number before logging to allow inclusion of directors whose peers did not sit on any other 
boards. 
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serving on the boards of large companies (e.g., Davis and Robbins, 2005)
5
. We used these 
indirect measures of director skill: the size (logged number of employees) and performance (total 
annual returns) of companies where the focal director currently served. For each director, we 
used the maximal value of each size and performance measure in our regressions
6
.  
We included two additional network measures. A director’s degree centrality (how many 
different directors serve on boards with the focal director) measures the number of peer directors 
for the focal director without regard to these peers’ other board appointments. We used logged 
degree centrality in our regressions. Eigenvector centrality is a recursive indicator of the focal 
director’s status in the overall director-director network. Directors who are linked to many 
well-linked directors rank higher in eigenvector centrality.  
Regressions also controlled for years since the first year in our dataset and included individual 
year effects. Table 4 contains details of how we constructed each measure from our data sources. 




Insert table 4 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 5 about here 
                                                          
5
 On the other hand, Westphal and colleagues (Westphal and Stern, 2007; Zajac and Westphal, 1996) have shown 
that being skilled at ingratiation and having a reputation for not actively monitoring CEO actions could lead to more 
board appointments. We cannot control for this in the current study. 
6
 Exploratory regressions showed that the maximal values of these measures explained more of the variance in 
subsequent director hiring than means or medians. Using means or medians instead yields the same significant 
regression results. Alternate specifications used logged market value for size and return on assets or return on equity 
for performance. The empirical conclusions below were unaffected by these substitutions. 
7
 For obvious reasons, director degree centrality was highly correlated with both the number of board seats held by 
the director and the number of distinct boards served by peer directors. Removing director degree centrality from the 
analysis did not change the pattern of results for the remaining variables. 
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-----------------------------------------— 
Models 1-3 in table 6 show the regression results from a random-effects unbalanced panel 
logistic regression calculating the effects of each independent variable on the probability of a 
director gaining a new board seat in the subsequent year. To capture monotonous changes in the 
effect of each independent variable over the years, we included the interaction terms of each 
independent variable with the number of years since 1997 (the first year in our data). Model 1 
shows results from the full model. We find that directors associated with larger companies were 
more likely to gain new board seats, but no effect for directors on the boards of higher 
performance companies, when controlling for demographic and network characteristics. Note the 
comparison with models 2 and 3, which show regression results without network measure 
regressors. Directors from more successful companies were not preferred per se, but may have 
been popular with board selection committees only because they had good network connections. 
Minority directors and social elite directors were preferentially hired onto additional boards 
throughout the period of the study. Minority directors were 1.47 times more likely than 
non-minority directors, and social elite directors 1.33 times more likely than non-elite directors, 
to gain an additional board seat in the next year. There was no significant preference for female 
directors, however. Corporate executives were initially less likely than non-executives to gain 
additional board seats, but this comparative propensity increased over time. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert table 6 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
Well-connected directors—those whose peer directors served on many other boards—were more 
likely to gain additional board seats throughout the period of the study. But this advantage 
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decreased over time. In 1997, each ten-fold increase in the number of distinct boards served by 
peer directors more than quadrupled the likelihood of the focal director gaining a new board seat 
in the next year. By 2010, the effect size was almost halved
8
.  
There was strong evidence of preferential attachment, by which the rich (in board seats) get 
richer, at the beginning of the study period. This preference for directors on many boards 
disappeared during the period of the study, however. In 1997, directors who served on two 
boards were approximately twice as likely to gain additional board seats as those who served on 
only one board, and the same held true for directors on three or more boards. By 2010 neither 
directors on two boards nor those on three or more boards were preferred compared to those on 
one board. 
To examine the changes in preferential hiring of well-boarded, well-connected, and corporate 
executive directors in more detail, we repeated the regression above, but substituted interactions 
with year dummies instead of with years since 1997 for the measures of number of boards, 
number of peer boards, and corporate executive status. This allowed us to estimate coefficients 
for these variables’ effects on hiring for each year in the study period, by taking the coefficient 
vector from the regression results and adding the coefficient of the interaction term of the 
independent variable with the year to the base year (1997) coefficient for the independent 
variable. We also calculated variances for each of these coefficients by using the covariance 
matrix with the sum formula for variances: 
 VARIANCE(a1 + a2) = VARIANCE(a1) + VARIANCE(a2) + 2 * COV(a1, a2) 
                                                          
8
 Note that when controlling for peer board reach and other network characteristics, increasing the number of peer 
directors negatively impacted the propensity to gain additional board seats. This is in line with social network 
research finding that the range and content of connections trumps sheer number of connections in determining 
outcomes for the focal actor (e.g., Burt, 1992; Cotton-Nessler, 2013). 
 21  
Four separate variance-weighted least-squares (VWLS) regressions confirm the overall shift in 
the values of these coefficients over the period of the study. Directors on multiple boards became 
comparatively less likely to gain additional board seats over time (directors on two boards: t = 
-4.40, p < 0.0005; on three or more boards: t = -5.74, p < 0.0005), as did directors with peers on 
many distinct boards (t = -3.05, p = 0.002). Corporate executives became comparatively more 
likely to gain new board appointments (t = 2.43, p = 0.015). 
Using the yearly coefficients obtained above, figure 6 plots the odds-ratios of joining a new 
board in the subsequent year for directors with multiple board seats compared to those with one 
board seat for each year from 1997 to 2009. The VWLS models predict that a director with two 
board seats in 1997 was 1.82 times more likely than a director with only one board seat to join a 
new board within the next year, but no more likely than the single-board director in 2009. The 
predicted change in log-odds for directors on three or more boards was even more drastic. A 
director on three or more boards in 1997 was 2.20 times more likely than a director on one board 
to join a new board within the next year, but became only 0.66 times as likely as a one-board 
director in 2009. This shift in preference for three or more board directors appears to have 
occurred abruptly between 2002 and 2003 (see figure 6 right graph). 
The effects of having peers on many boards are shown in figure 7. In 1997, a director with ten 
times the one-step board reach of an otherwise similar director was predicted to have a 4.31 
times higher chance of gaining a new board seat in the subsequent year. By 2009, this difference 
in propensities was reduced to 2.40. Having well-placed peers still helped, but much less so. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 6 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 7 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
The preference shifts described above were not driven by new types of companies joining the 
S&P 1500, such as Internet companies around the turn of the century. Model 4 in table 6 shows 
the results of regressions with a dependent variable that was coded as 1 only if the director joined 
the board of a company in the survivor panel, which consisted of companies present in the S&P 
1500 in all years from 1997 to 2010. A similar pattern of results is obtained.  
The decline in comparative propensity to be hired onto additional boards for well-boarded and 
well-connected directors compared to their less-boarded and less-connected peers is congruent 
with a shift in companies’ preference for certain types of directors. But another explanation for 
these results is that director preferences changed while company hiring preferences remained 
constant. Instead of companies eschewing multiple board directors and placing less weight on 
personal introductions, well-boarded directors may have become loath to take on more board 
appointments and well-connected directors less likely to rely on personal contacts to find new 
board seats. 
An examination of the effects of shareholder proposals on board hiring propensities provides 
support for a shift in boards’ hiring preferences rather than a shift in directors’ preferences. 
Figure 8 shows results from two separate logistic regressions with fixed company effects, where 
the dependent variables are the propensity to hire certain types of directors. The left panel graphs 
the effect of being targeted by a shareholder proposal on a company’s propensity to hire directors 
on three or more boards. The right panel displays the same effect for the propensity to hire 
directors who are well-connected (linked to 10 or more boards they do not already serve on 
 23  
through board peers). Boards targeted by shareholder proposals in 1997 tended to respond by 
hiring well-boarded and well-connected directors. By 2009, being targeted by shareholder 
proposals had the opposite effect. Targeted boards eschewed well-boarded, well-connected 
directors. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 8 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
An examination of how often board seats were filled by directors with no previous S&P 1500 
board experience also provides support for changed corporate preferences, suggesting that 
corporations came to place less emphasis on directors’ connections to other boards. Figure 9 
plots the observed probability that a board appointment was filled by a director with no existing 
board appointments from 1998 to 2010. A linear regression predicts an approximately 5% 
increase between 1998 and 2010 in the percentage of board appointments filled by directors not 
already serving on another board. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 9 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
Who killed the inner circle? 
Did the decreased preferences for well-connected directors lead to the collapse of cohesion in the 
interlock network? We adopt a two-prong approach to answering this question. First, we 
consider possible alternative causes of the decline in interlock network connectedness, and check 
to see if these possible causes are observed. Second, we use Monte Carlo simulations to test 
whether the observed changes in preference for well-boarded and well-connected directors were 
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sufficient to explain the magnitude of change in the interlock network’s macro-structure. 
The regression results in table 6 show that preferences for directors on large company or 
high-performing company boards, for female, minority, and social elite directors, and for 
network degree- or eigenvector-central directors did not significantly change during the period of 
the study. A similar regression for directors’ propensity to leave an existing board appointment 
in the next year showed that directors on two or more boards and directors with high eigenvector 
centrality became less likely to leave a board over the period of the study. 
We also checked for the occurrence of several other shifts that could potentially explain the 
decrease in interlock network connectedness. Company entries and exits into the S&P 1500 did 
not become more frequent over time. More central companies and companies with more 
well-boarded directors did not become more likely to leave the S&P 1500 during the period 
under study; we found no significant changes in propensity to leave the S&P 1500 based on 
company degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, 
number of directors, mean degree of directors, mean eigenvector centrality of directors, mean 
closeness centrality of directors, or mean number of board seats held by directors, nor on the 
percentile rank (by year) of each of these variables. The characteristics of new entrants to the 
S&P 1500 did not change significantly. Examining companies in their first year of listing on the 
S&P 1500, we found no temporal trend in their percentile rankings on degree centrality, 
eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, number of directors, mean 
director degree centrality, mean director eigenvector centrality, mean director closeness 
centrality, and mean number of board seats. In a further test of whether newer companies’ 
director hiring was driving the decrease in interlock network connectedness, we calculated 
network statistics for a survivor panel consisting of the 403 companies that were in the S&P 
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1500 throughout the 14 years of our study. The mean geodesic increased steadily for this panel 
as well (figure 10).  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 10 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
Changes in board size also cannot explain the observed decrease in interlock network 
connectedness. The average board size decreased slightly from 9.67 directors in 2000 to 9.35 
directors in 2010. This small drop cannot explain the reduction in the average degree of 
companies from 7.14 to 4.98 during the same period. Over the period of the study, companies 
with more direct board ties to other companies became more likely to increase their board size 
and less likely to decrease board size compared to those with less degree. The companies with 
more connected directors (higher director mean degree) also became less likely to decrease board 
size compared to companies with directors with lower average degree. On the other hand, 
companies with more directors became more likely to decrease the size of their boards compared 
to companies with fewer directors. 
After ruling out alternatives, we are left with four confirmed shifts in director hiring patterns: 
increased preferences for corporate executives and for individuals with no current board 
appointments, and decreased preferences for individuals with many current board appointments 
and with peers on many other boards. While the effects of the preference shift in favor of 
corporate executives on the connectedness of the interlock network are uncertain, the latter three 
shifts in preference all militate for decreased interlock network connectedness. The presence of 
more directors with only a single board appointment leads to a decrease in the number of links 
between companies. The non-appearance of super-connectors—directors on many boards who 
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connect directors on many other boards—leads to a network with higher average number of steps 
between companies. 
To test whether these observed shifts in hiring patterns were sufficient to explain the 
macro-structural changes in the interlock network, we coded a simulation. The simulation 
allowed us to model counterfactual scenarios where the four shifts in preference were not present. 
In the baseline Reality scenario, we calculated relative odds of gaining a new board seat for each 
director present in a year y using annual log-odds coefficients from the variance-weighted least 
squares regressions for whether the director was a corporate executive, whether the director was 
on two boards, whether the director was on three or more boards, and the logged number of 
distinct boards served by the focal director’s peers. The model ignored the effect of all other 
director characteristics.  
Starting from 1997 and iterating over the years, we simulated each board appointment where a 
director who already had an S&P 1500 board appointment was hired in the historical record in 
the next year (y+1). For each of the simulated board appointments, a director was randomly 
selected to take the board seat, with each director’s odds of being selected determined by his or 
her calculated log-odds based on corporate executive status, number of current boards, and 
number of peer-linked boards. From 1998 on, previous year simulation results provided the 
choice set of available directors and their relative odds of gaining a new board seat in the next 
year. 
We modeled a series of counterfactual scenarios. In the full Counterfactual scenario, we did not 
use varying log-odds coefficients for the four factors above. Instead, the log-odds coefficients 
were held constant at the average log-odds coefficient for each independent variable for the first 
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six years of historical data (1997 to 2002). This corresponds to an alternative universe where the 
shifts in preference for corporate executives, directors on two or three-plus boards, and directors 
with higher board reach did not occur. The full Counterfactual scenario also eliminated the 
observed increase in propensity to hire directors with no existing board appointments. The rate of 
zero-board director hiring was held constant by randomly-selecting zero-board director hires in 
the historical data and simulating the hiring of an existing director into the position. 
The effect of each preference shift was also tested separately. Four partial-counterfactual 
scenarios each held log-odds coefficients for one independent variable constant, while using 
time-varying log-odds coefficients for the other independent variables. Another 
partial-counterfactual scenario held the log-odds coefficients for both whether a director was on 
two boards and whether a director was on three or more boards constant, corresponding to a 
counterfactual where there was no shift in preference for well-boarded directors. A final 
partial-counterfactual scenario modeled only the effect of maintaining a constant rate of 
zero-board director hiring. 
Figure 11 displays simulation results for the 2010 mean geodesic for the S&P 1500. The 
distribution of mean geodesics over 100 runs of the Reality scenario is centered close to the 2010 
mean geodesic observed in the historical data of 4.96. The distribution for the full Counterfactual 
scenario is centered close to the observed 1996 mean geodesic of 4.16. An examination of the 
partial-counterfactual scenario results shows that the change in propensity for corporate 
executives to gain new board seats was inconsequential in its effect, but the other propensity 
changes all mattered. 
These results indicate that the observed shifts in preferences for zero-board, well-boarded, and 
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well-connected directors were sufficient to explain the magnitude of the change in the interlock 
network’s mean step distance between companies. Conversely, if these preference shifts had not 
occurred, we would expect the interlock network mean geodesic in 2010 to be little changed 
from its value in 1996. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 11 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
While figure 11 shows an uncanny quantitative agreement with the historical data, this was not 
expected. The model omits many factors that could affect the shape of the interlock network, 
such as assortative matching (e.g., larger companies may be more likely to hire directors on more 
boards) and the aforementioned effects of being targeted by shareholder proposals. We expect 
that these omissions should cause the simulation to overestimate the geodesic-lengthening in the 
center of the network (e.g., the S&P 500) and underestimate it outside the center of the network. 
Nevertheless, the change in overall mean geodesic can be explained by our simple simulation 
model without needing to resort to a more complicated model. 
Figure 12 shows distributions of the number of board appointments for directors for 
representative Reality and Counterfactual scenario runs (respectively one of the two Reality or 
Counterfactual scenario runs wherein the run’s mean geodesic was closest to the median mean 
geodesic for all runs in the respective scenario). Figure 13 shows degree distributions of the 
number of ties to other companies for companies from these simulation runs. Comparing these 
distributions to the observed historical distributions in figures 3 and 4 shows that the identified 
shifts in preference for certain types of directors are sufficient to explain the decrease in directors 
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Insert figure 12 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 13 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
Revisiting prior scholarship on the effects of board ties 
To illustrate the impact of the interlock network changes described above, we revisit three classic 
studies of the effects of interlock ties, and examine whether and how their findings still apply in 
the less connected interlock network. Among other functions (Mizruchi, 1996), shared board 
memberships have been identified as a central mechanism for socializing new elites (Useem, 
1984), fostering political unity (Mizruchi, 1992), and diffusing corporate practices (Davis, 1991). 
We find that the interlock network is no longer connected enough to act as an effective 
mechanism for these processes. 
In his groundbreaking study of American and British boards of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Useem (1984) described the interlock network as a broadly-connected, elite socialization device. 
An individual newly-appointed to his (and it was almost always his, not her) first board seat 
could catch the eye of an established member of the inner circle, someone who already served on 
many corporate boards and was connected to others who did also. If the new board appointee 
passed muster and proved amenable to mentoring, this mentor would sponsor him for 
                                                          
9
 Here, the effects of ignoring assortative matching are more easily identified. We see a shorter right-hand tail for 
the Reality simulated data than observed in the historical data. 
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membership in more corporate boards, suggest government and civic affiliations, and nudge him 
towards the appropriate political views for a member of the inner circle. 
This narrative is predicated on the existence of a group of mutually-connected, 
frequently-interacting individuals, each on many boards, and collectively connected to the 
majority of the interlock network. Our data show that no such group existed by 2010. In 1997, 
363 of the 432 S&P 500 companies with any interlocks were linked by a single network of 
directors with three or more board seats serving on boards with each other. The mean geodesic 
between companies on this network of well-boarded directors was 3.24; on average, any 
company’s board could reach any other company board through a director’s friend or friend of a 
friend. By 2010, only 244 of 440 companies were connected in the main component of directors 
with three or more board seats linked to similarly well-boarded directors, and there were four 
smaller components of three to six companies each connected in this way. The mean geodesic in 
the (much smaller compared to that in 1997) main component lengthened to 4.85
10
. 
The disappearance of a cohesive inner circle is even more apparent when considering the 
network between companies created by shared directors each on four or more boards. A 
258-company component existed in 1997 with a single smaller component of four companies. 
There was no longer a predominant component by 2010. The largest component comprised 17 
companies, alongside ten more components with between four and ten companies apiece. The 
broader S&P 1500 network underwent similar de-cohesion. There were four components each 
linked by directors on four or more boards in 1997, with the main component creating a 
connected core of 510 companies, but in 2010, there were 28 components with the largest 
                                                          
10
 To put this number—a mean geodesic of 4.85 between 244 companies—in perspective, the average Twitter 
follower network geodesic in 2010 was estimated to be between 3.43 and 4.12 for a network size of approximately 
200 million users (Bakhshandeh, Samadi, Azimifar, and Schaeffer, 2011). The acquaintance network in the U.S. 
population of 200 million in the late 1960s was estimated to have a geodesic between 3 and 5.2 (Milgram, 1967). 
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consisting of 62 companies and most with only four companies each. 
Against this changed backdrop, a director joining his first corporate board became unlikely to 
meet another director who could introduce him to many other boards. Even if the newly-minted 
director was lucky enough to serve on a board with such a well-boarded, well-connected director, 
the senior director’s board connections would span only a small part of the corporate milieu. The 
new director could not climb into the corporate interlock network inner circle through 
introductions from his well-connected board peers. Indeed, there was no inner circle left to join. 
Mizruchi’s (1992) classic study of large firms’ political action provided evidence for the 
unifying effects of interlock ties, finding that director interlocks increase political cohesion. 
Commercial banks figure prominently in his analysis; in 1980, the focal year of Mizruchi’s 
analysis, commercial bank boards formed the hubs of the interlock network. By 1997, 
commercial banks were no longer at the center of the network, however, so examining how his 
findings would be changed by the de-cohesion of the interlock network from 1997 onwards is 
not instructive. 
A better study to revisit for our current purposes is Burris’s (2005) study of the effect of shared 
board memberships on political contributions by top executives. Using data from 1980 (the same 
year studied by Mizruchi [1992]), Burris found that serving on the same board caused executives 
to adopt similar patterns of political donation. The average dissimilarity in giving—the 
difference in percentage of total political contributions allocated to the Republican Party between 
a pair of executives—was 24% for pairs of executives who served on the same board, compared 
to 34% for pairs of executives in general
11
. Sharing a board affiliation was consequential in 
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 Even a 24% average dissimilarity is indicative of a bimodal distribution of political giving, albeit significantly 
less-polarized than a donation distribution with 34% average dissimilarity. 
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increasing political consensus. The effects of serving on the same board were much stronger than 
the effects of being employed by companies in the same industry or state. 
We modeled the consensus-generating effect of interlock ties using our S&P 500 data for 1997 
and 2010, restricting the data to include only corporate executives and the ties between them. 
Our data covers 1,134 executives in 1997 and 768 in 2010, with 69.8% of executives in 1997 and 
58.1% in 2010 with at least one interlock tie to another executive. (Burris’s [2005] sample 
consisted of 761 executives, with 62% having at least one interlock tie.) Interlock ties between 
executives with the same employer were excluded from the analysis. 
Each director’s percentage of total political contributions allocated to the Republican Party was 
calculated in a two-step process. Each executive’s latent baseline—unaffected by ties to other 
executives—percentage of political giving allocated to the Republican Party was drawn 
randomly from a strongly bimodal probability distribution. The distribution was created by 
summing two normal distributions, one with mean 0.41667 and standard deviation 0.08333, and 
the other with mean -0.41667 and the same standard deviation. The summed distribution was 
truncated at ±0.5 (-0.5 corresponded to making 100% of political donations to the Democratic 
Party, +0.5 to making 100% of donations to the Republican Party), and normalized so the area 
under the probability distribution curve summed to one. Next, each director’s percentage of 
contributions going to the Republican Party was adjusted to be closer to his or her board peers’ 
donations. Each director's giving was shifted towards their peers' mean; a director’s Republican 
contribution percentage was calculated as the weighted average of the focal director’s baseline 
Republican percentage and that of his or her peers, with the focal director’s baseline percentage 
 33  
weighted ten times higher than his or her peers’12. 
We find a weakened political unifying and moderating effect for the interlock network. Using the 
1997 network, the simulation predicts that a pair of executives who serve on the same board will 
have on average a 24% difference in political contribution percentage to the Republican Party, 
compared to a 37% difference between two executives randomly selected without regard to 
interlock ties. Even though the effects of each individual board tie are held constant across the 
1997 and 2010 network scenarios, the decrease in overall network density leads to increased 
differences in political contribution percentage allocated to Republicans for board peers—an 
average 30% difference between linked directors in 2010. The similarity boost from serving on 
the same board is halved, purely because of the decrease in the connectedness of the overall 
interlock network.  
A weakened unifying effect leads to more polarized political action. Comparing the simulated 
distributions of executives’ percentage of contributions to the Republican Party for the 1997 and 
2010 interlock networks (figure 14) shows a shift away from giving similar amounts to both 
political parties towards allocating almost all one’s contributions to one party. While both 
distributions are bimodal, the 2010 distribution has many more extremely polarized donors on 
both sides of the political spectrum, while more balanced, centrist contributors have all but 
disappeared. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 14 about here 
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 The shape of the baseline bimodal distribution and the ten-fold weight for a focal director’s baseline percentage 
versus his or her peers were chosen through trial and error to give distributions similar to Burris’s for 1997. This 
allows us to relate our simulation results to his empirical findings. Using different shapes for the bimodal 
distribution and values for the peer influence weight yielded similar results. 
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-----------------------------------------— 
Studying the spread of poison pill anti-takeover defenses in the Fortune 500, Davis (1991) found 
that innovations diffused across the board interlock network. The number of interlock ties to 
prior adopters was the best predictor of whether a company opted to adopt poison pill provisions.  
Being connected by shared board members to companies that had already adopted poison pills 
increased the probability that a company would also adopt the takeover defense. The more prior 
adopters (up to an optimal, for adoption, value of six) a company was connected to on the 
interlock network, the higher the probability the company also chose to adopt a poison pill 
provision. While a tie to one prior adopter increased the rate of adoption by about 60% compared 
to when a company had no ties to prior adopters, possessing ties to three prior adopters more 
than doubled the adoption rate. A firm with ties to six prior adopters had the highest rate of 
poison pill adoption, about 2.5 times the rate for a company with no ties to prior adopters. 
We simulated poison pill adoption using the interlock networks for 593 large companies in 1982 
and this study’s 2010 S&P 50013 companies. The simulation was run 1,000 times for each 
condition (1982 and 2010 interlock networks), with the interlock network held constant 
throughout each simulation. Each simulation run consisted of 20 sequential quarters. In each 
quarter, a company’s propensity to adopt a poison pill was set proportional to 
𝑒0.2094×ln(INTERLOCKS+1) + 0.643×ln(TIES TO ADOPTERS+1) – 0.1689×ln(TIES
2+1) 
where INTERLOCKS is the number of directly interlocked boards of the focal company, TIES 
TO ADOPTERS is the number of directly interlocked boards which have adopted a poison pill in 
a prior quarter, and TIES
2 
is the square of this number. The coefficients were taken from model 6 
                                                          
13
 The 1982 dataset is the one used in Davis et al., (2003). Using the current study’s 1997 S&P 500 interlock 
network instead of the 1982 data yields similar results. We present results using the 1982 data since the interlock 
structure then is more likely to be similar to the structure during 1984 to 1989, the period of Davis’s (1991) study. 
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in table 2 of Davis’s (1991) study. We multiplied this propensity by a normalizing factor to 
derive the probability that a given company would adopt a poison pill in the quarter. The 
normalizing factor was calibrated to reproduce the observed adoption pattern by quarter (Davis 
[1991], figure 3) for the 1982 network.  
Calibrating the normalization factor in this way constrains the shape of the simulated adoption 
curves. Both the curves for the 1982 network and the 2010 network are similar to Davis’s 
observed adoption curve (1991, figure 1). The 2010 adoption curve is less steep relative to the 
1982 curve, and, on average, only 50% of the companies adopt poison pills by the end of the 
simulation, compared to 62% in the 1982 simulation runs. 
A much more striking difference is observed in the mechanisms of poison pill adoption. 
Examining the ratio of adopters with links to three or more prior adopters versus those with links 
to two or fewer prior adopters (figure 15) shows that most of the poison pill adoptions on the 
1982 network after quarter 7 could conceivably be attributed to diffusion through board links to 
multiple prior adopters. This mechanism cannot account for the majority of adoptions in the 
2010 network at any time during the simulation period, however, as the less connected network 
structure provided fewer links to prior adopters. In the middle of the simulation period, at quarter 
10 where the adoption curve was steepest, 2/3 of companies adopting poison pills in the 1982 
network were connected to three or more prior adopters. Contagion from exposure to multiple 
prior adopters could be a significant driver of adoption as half of at risk companies (those which 
had not yet adopted poison pill provisions) were linked to three or more prior adopters. In 
contrast, only 1/5 of at risk companies were linked to three or more prior adopters in quarter 10 
of simulations using the 2010 network, and only 1/4 of poison pill adoptions occurred in 
companies connected to three or more prior adopters.  
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By 2010, it was logically impossible for an innovation to spread rapidly via interlock links to 
multiple prior adopters. The typical company shared too few directors with prior adopters to 
allow for multiple exposures to a new innovation, until the innovation was already widespread. 
Different, most probably non-interlock-based, mechanisms now underlie the spread of new 
management practices. If such mechanisms are less effective than interlock ties in the 1980s, 
then there will be less isomorphism in corporate policies today. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert figure 15 about here 
-----------------------------------------— 
The United States without a cohesive corporate elite 
Our findings show that the U.S. board interlock network has changed in fundamental ways. 
Much that was true of the interlock network for 100 years became untrue within ten subsequent 
years. The U.S. corporate interlock network suffered a striking decline in connectedness. This 
decline was driven by a radical shift in the characteristics of directors invited onto additional 
boards. The preference for directors on many boards disappeared. Directors serving on three or 
more boards may now be less likely than those serving on one board to gain a new board seat. 
The value of being well-connected through peers serving on other boards also declined. 
It is important to point out that the interlock network had faced momentous challenges before. 
Brandeis’s exposé in 1914 led many bankers to resign their directorships en masse later that year. 
Wars, market crashes, the Depression, and multiple merger waves shuffled the players but did 
little to alter the existence of an inner circle. The interlock network remained densely-connected 
and consistent in its properties throughout these changes. Seven firms that were among the ten 
most central in 1962 were also in the top ten in 1982—six of them banks. In the subsequent two 
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decades, however, banks shrunk their boards and stopped recruiting well-connected directors, 
and the banking industry consolidated (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999); hundreds of large 
corporations were taken over and their boards disbanded; and demands from corporate 
constituents for greater diversity led to a demographic shift in directors, mostly benefiting a 
small handful of directors (such as Vernon Jordan). Yet the average geodesic stayed nearly 
constant, and the inner circle endured (Davis et al., 2003). It appeared that the inner circle and 
the network’s cohesion were durably resilient, perhaps even inevitable “emergent properties of 
networks qua networks” (Davis et al., 2003: 322). 
The crucial difference between the changes described in this paper and previous interlock 
network transformations was the breakdown of the preference for well-connected directors. 
Whereas directors were previously sought after because of their legitimating connections, the 
financial scandals of the early 2000s and the attendant public outcry reversed this social 
construction (cf. Zhu & Westphal, 2011) and turned “corporate diplomats” (Useem, 1984) into 
“busy” (e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) or 
“overworked” directors. Companies became leery of hiring multi-board directors lest they be 
chastised by analysts and investors. This rapid social de-construction of prestige occurred when 
multiple-board membership had become decoupled from social elite membership and corporate 
power. In the 1970s, over 90 directors, almost all corporate executives and all but one white, 
served on five or more boards each. By the late 1990s, directors with the most board 
appointments were often African-Americans with experience outside the traditional corporate 
sphere. The increasing number of minority directors in U.S. boardrooms was and is a testament 
to the progress towards racial equality made in the United States over the latter half of the 20th 
century. This silver lining has a cloud, however. When scandals, such as the Penn Central 
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bankruptcy, erupted in the 1970s, the status of well-boarded directors was not threatened. After 
the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, on the other hand, directors serving on many boards 
were vilified. 
Studies of U.S. board interlocks have proliferated over the past thirty years. For the board 
researcher of today, our results are both exciting and damning. On one hand, everything old is 
new again. The foundational laws of the network have changed. Directors sitting on multiple 
boards are no longer sought out. The interlock network is no longer a reliable map of elite power. 
Social distances are no longer reliably shortened by board ties. The findings of classic 
studies—on elite socialization and class consciousness, on political unity and pragmatism, and 
on corporate learning and isomorphism—no longer hold. Previously discovered “facts” need 
reconfirmation. On the other hand, the network is now less interesting in some senses. The 
interlock network no longer tells us much about who holds power in U.S. society. Nor does it 
provide a substrate for rapid isomorphism. Future studies will have to establish new reasons for 
studying the changed interlock network. 
More broadly, the findings presented here call into question whether a broad-based, cohesive 
social elite still exist in the United States. Mizruchi (2013) makes this argument, asserting that a 
moderate, highly-connected and influential core of business leaders—the corporate 
elite—continually existed from the early 20th century, but disappeared in the 1990s. In his view, 
an “active state, powerful labor, and a financial community whose interests transcended those of 
particular firms or sectors” forced the corporate elite to unite and defend the corporate system. In 
the 1980s, the moderating influences of the state, labor and commercial banks were weakened, 
and instead “shareholder value” became the dominant logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
Institutional investors (Useem, 1996), financial analysts (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005) and the capital 
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market itself (Davis, 2009) came to exert control on CEOs and directors. On one hand, the 
corporate elite had won the war, and the U.S. corporate system had become a taken-for-granted 
institution. Attempts by labor or government to place restrictions on corporations were now 
deemed ill-advised, even unpatriotic. On the other hand, the new shareholder value master 
proved a tyrant. Public company CEOs lost job security, and found themselves scrambling to 
survive individually by capturing more market value for their individual firms. The corporate 
elite no longer had the motivation nor the ability to band together to defend their interests as a 
class. With the corporate elite fragmented, U.S. society lost a powerful consensus-building, 
politically-moderate interest group. 
Another possibility is that the social elite still coheres, but has found new, more hospitable 
enclaves, protected from non-elite entry and hidden from public scrutiny. Davis (2013) suggests 
that public corporations are losing their central place in the American economy, noting that the 
number of listed companies in the U.S. dropped by more than half between 1997 and 2012, as 
the number of de-listings consistently outpaced the number of companies going public.
14
 
Moreover, companies going public most recently have adopted market-hostile governance 
structures, giving their founders super-voting rights that ensure their control. (The three founders 
of Groupon, for instance, hold stakes giving them 150 votes per share; Mark Zuckerberg 
personally controls an absolute majority of Facebook’s voting rights.) It is possible that the 
public corporation as we know it is an artifact of the 20th century, and thus those who direct 
public corporations are no longer society’s elites. The study of social elites in the 21st century 
will have to follow a different path than that of the study of 20th century elites. 
                                                          
14
 On the other hand, the number of private equity-owned companies increased dramatically during this period. 
Members of the boards of these companies are not subject to the same public scrutiny. 
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FIGURE 1 
Mean geodesic in main component of board interlock networks, 1982-2010 
 
NOTE—1982-1999 data from Davis et al. (2003); 1997-2010 this study; study population differs 
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FIGURE 2 
S&P 500 interlock network, 1996 and 2010 
 
 
NOTE—Left figure is main component in 1996, right in 2010.
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 4 
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FIGURE 5 




































Age in 2001 
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FIGURE 6 
Odds ratios for directors on multiple boards compared to directors on one board of gaining 
a new board appointment in next year (log scale) 
 
 
NOTE—The points are the observed odds-ratios for each year, the error bars are standard errors 
in these odds-ratios, and the lines are predictions of a variance-weighted least squares regression. 
Separate VWLS regressions on the first six years (1997 to 2002) and the remaining seven years 
for directors on three or more boards do not yield a linear trend with a slope significantly 
different from 0 (z = -0.60 and -0.91 respectively). 
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FIGURE 7 




NOTE—Effect of ten-fold increase in number of linked boards. The points are the observed 
odds-ratios for each year, the error bars are standard errors in these odds-ratios, and the lines are 
predictions of a variance-weighted least squares regression. 
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FIGURE 8 
Effect of being targeted by shareholder proposal  
 
NOTE—The points are the observed odds-ratios for each year, the error bars are standard errors 
in these odds-ratios, and the lines are predictions of a variance-weighted least squares regression. 
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FIGURE 9 
Percentage of board appointments filled by director with no existing board appointments 
 
 
NOTE—The points are observed values for each year. The line is a linear least-squares 
regression. 
y = 0.0043x - 7.8841 
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FIGURE 10 
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FIGURE 11 




















NOTE— Eight scenarios of 100 runs each. Vertical dashed lines indicate observed historical 
mean geodesic in S&P 1500 for 1996 and 2010. Solid curves show distributions for 
“Counterfactual” and “Reality” simulation scenarios. Dashed curves show distributions for 
scenarios where one or more independent variables’ effect has been held steady (as in the 
Counterfactual scenario), while the remaining independent variables’ effects have been allowed 
to change (as in the Reality scenario). The held-constant variables for each dashed scenario are:  
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○2  Director is on two boards 
○3  Number of non-overlapping boards where peer directors served 
○4  Proportion of board seats taken by new versus existing directors 
○5  Director is on three or more boards 
○6  Director is on two boards, and Director is on three or more boards 
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FIGURE 12 
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FIGURE 13 
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FIGURE 14 
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FIGURE 15 
Number of new adopters with ties to three or more prior adopters compared to number of 
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Characteristic 1904 1912 1919 1935 1964 1969 1974 1999 2000 2010
Number of connected firms 154 140 143 145 153 153 145 811 425 440
3-step reach of most central corporation (%) 90.9 81.9 85.5 80.7 90.4 91.0 84.9 82.4 84.2 60.9
Directors on 6 or more boards 24 27 14 3 4 2 0 * 8 0
† 1904-1974 data from Mizruchi (1982: 105-108); 1999 from Davis et al. (2003: 320); 2000-2010 this study; study population differs across 
   the three sources.
* Data not available in source article.
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of the board interlock network, 1912-2010 
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TABLE 2 
Top-25 (including ties) degree centrality companies in S&P 1500 interlock network 
 
Year 2000 Year 2010
Rank Degree Company Rank Degree Company
1 37 SARA LEE 1 21 MARATHON OIL CORPORATION
1 37 ALLSTATE 2 20 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION
3 35 BANK OF AMERICA 2 20 STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC.
3 35 SBC COMMUNICATIONS 2 20 H. J. HEINZ COMPANY
5 34 BELL ATLANTIC 2 20 LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC.
6 33 CHASE MANHATTAN 6 19 THE PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION
6 33 SCHERING-PLOUGH 7 18 CATERPILLAR INC.
8 32 EXXONMOBIL 7 18 AON CORPORATION
9 30 XEROX 7 18 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.
9 30 EQUIFAX 10 17 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.
9 30 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 10 17 THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.
12 29 AMR 10 17 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP
12 29 BANK ONE 10 17 KEYCORP
12 29 SUNTRUST BANKS 10 17 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
12 29 KROGER 10 17 CHEVRON CORPORATION
16 28 PROTECTIVE LIFE 10 17 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
16 28 KMART 10 17 MCDONALD'S CORPORATION
16 28 VULCAN MATERIALS 10 17 FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
16 28 BELLSOUTH 10 17 PFIZER INC.
16 28 MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING (3M) 20 16 SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION
21 27 PROCTER & GAMBLE 20 16 THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP
21 27 AT&T 20 16 ENPRO INDUSTRIES, INC.
21 27 UNION CARBIDE 23 15 ELI LILLY AND COMPANY
21 27 FLEET BOSTON 23 15 MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION
25 26 PEPSICO 23 15 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION
25 26 AON 23 15 DEERE & COMPANY
25 26 SPRINGS INDUSTRIES 23 15 3M COMPANY
25 26 SUNOCO 23 15 QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
 61  
TABLE 3 
Top-25 (including ties) degree centrality directors in S&P 1500 interlock network  
 
Year 2000 Year 2010
Rank Degree Director Age Gender Ethnicity Rank Degree Director Age Gender Ethnicity
1 101 VERNON E JORDAN JR 65 Male Black 1 53 SAM NUNN 72 Male White
2 81 RONALD L KUEHN JR 64 Male White 2 52 EDUARDO MENASCE 66 Male White
3 79 JOHN L CLENDENIN 65 Male White 3 51 FREDERIC V SALERNO 67 Male White
4 75 EDWARD E WHITACRE JR 58 Male White 3 51 ROBERT L RYAN 66 Male Black
5 70 WILLIE D DAVIS 66 Male Black 3 51 SHIRLEY A JACKSON 63 Female Black
6 69 ELAINE L CHAO 46 Female Asian 6 50 DENNIS H CHOOKASZIAN 66 Male White
6 69 CHARLES F KNIGHT 64 Male White 6 50 ARTHUR C MARTINEZ 70 Male White
8 66 LOUIS W SULLIVAN 66 Male Black 6 50 ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ JR 54 Male Hispanic
8 66 CHARLES W COKER 67 Male White 9 48 RICHARD J SWIFT 65 Male White
8 66 SAM NUNN 62 Male White 10 47 EDWARD J MOONEY 69 Male White
11 65 JOHN W SNOW 60 Male White 10 47 THOMAS J USHER 67 Male White
11 65 STEPHEN R HARDIS 64 Male White 10 47 JAMES H HANCE JR. 66 Male White
11 65 GEORGE J MITCHELL 66 Male White 13 46 KENNETH M DUBERSTEIN 65 Male White
11 65 LYNN M MARTIN 60 Female White 13 46 BARRY DILLER 68 Male White
11 65 FRANK S ROYAL 60 Male Black 13 46 RICHARD B MYERS 68 Male White
11 65 JACQUELYN M WARD 62 Female White 13 46 WILLIAM H. GRAY III 69 Male Black
17 64 HANS W BECHERER 64 Male White 17 45 STEVEN S REINEMUND 61 Male White
17 64 ANN M KOROLOGOS 58 Female White 17 45 MANUEL A FERNANDEZ 63 Male Hispanic
19 63 IVAN G SEIDENBERG 53 Male White 19 44 J MICHAEL LOSH 64 Male White
19 63 JAMES F HARDYMON 65 Male White 19 44 HANSEL E TOOKES II 63 Male Black
21 62 MARY JOHNSTON EVANS 70 Female White 19 44 LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON 63 Female White
22 61 ALAN T DICKSON 68 Male White 22 43 CHARLES R LEE 70 Male White
23 60 BRIAN H ROWE 69 Male White 22 43 JAMES H BLANCHARD 68 Male White
24 59 ROBERT P LUCIANO 66 Male White 22 43 ROBERT T BRADY 70 Male White
24 59 JOHN R STAFFORD 62 Male White 22 43 R DAVID HOOVER 64 Male White
24 59 JOHN G BREEN 66 Male White 22 43 KRISS CLONINGER III 62 Male White
24 59 DONALD F MCHENRY 63 Male Black 22 43 CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY 60 Female White
24 59 DONALD V FITES 66 Male White 22 43 JOHN C. MALONE 70 Male White
24 59 BOBBY R INMAN 69 Male White 22 43 VIRGIS W. COLBERT 71 Male Black
24 59 PAUL FULTON 65 Male White
24 59 LEONARD S COLEMAN 50 Male White
24 59 FRANKLIN A THOMAS 65 Male Black
24 59 RAY J GROVES 64 Male White
24 59 ROZANNE L RIDGWAY 65 Female White




Years since 1997 The data year minus 1997 
Age & age
2
 ISS/RiskMetrics lists age as of the date of the proxy statement while Boardex 
lists age as of the data of data access. ISS/RiskMetrics often has conflicting age 
information for the same director. We converted each ISS/RiskMetrics age 
entry into age as of end of 2010, and then took the modal age if the ages listed 
for a director differed by less than two years for all pairs of entries. For those 
entries where there was no modal age or the difference between a pair of ages 
listed was greater than two years, we examined and corrected the entries 
manually, often using web searches to check birthdates and ages. Boardex data 
is as of late 2010. For cases where Boardex and corrected ISS/RiskMetrics 
ages differed by more than two years, we again corrected entries manually. 
Where Boardex and ISS/RiskMetrics ages differed but by no more than two 
years, Boardex-listed ages were used in the final dataset. 
Maximum number of 
employees (logged) 
For each director, we selected the largest company (by number of employees) 
whose board the director sat on during the focal year, and took the log of the 
number of employees. Preliminary analyses showed that using the largest 
company value instead of a median or average value has better predictive 
power. These analyses also showed that number of employees is a better 
predictor of additional board seats than company market value. 
Maximum annual 
return 
For each director, we selected the best performing company (by total annual 
market return) whose board the director sat on during the focal year. 
Preliminary analyses showed that using the largest company value instead of a 
median or average value has better predictive power. These analyses also 
showed that company market return is a better predictor of additional board 
seats than industry-standardized ROA or ROE. 
Female director Coded 1 for female directors. Data on gender came from both ISS/RiskMetrics 
and Boardex. First, in cases where ISS/RiskMetrics had conflicting listings of a 
director’s gender, we examined and corrected ISS/RiskMetrics data manually, 
using web searches to confirm the gender of the director in question. Second, 
after we had created a lookup of director database identifiers between 
ISS/RiskMetrics and Boardex, we cross-checked gender between the two 
databases. Where there were discrepancies, we again manually corrected the 
entries. 
Minority director Coded 1 for non-white directors. Ethnicity data came from ISS/RiskMetrics. 
ISS/RiskMetrics often lists conflicting ethnicity information for the same 
director in different years or on different boards. If one ethnicity was listed 
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more than 75% of the time for a director, we used that ethnicity for the 
director. For each director for whom there was no such dominant ethnicity 
identification, we examined and determined the ethnicity manually, often using 
web searches to confirm the ethnicity of the director in question. 
Social elite director Directors were coded as a member of the social elite if they were white, male 
and had an educational affiliation with Harvard, Yale, Princeton or Stanford 
listed in Boardex. Ethnicity, gender and elite education credentials have been 
shown to correspond with social elite membership (e.g., Useem and Karabel, 
1986). The correlation between these demographic markers and elite 
membership is far from perfect, but is reasonable for directors during the 
period under study. 
Corporate executive Directors were identified as corporate executives in a given year if they were 
listed in ISS/RiskMetrics as being an employee director for a firm. 
Occasionally, directors may not be on the board of their employer, but sit only 
on an outside board or boards. These cases are not captured in the data. 
Director degree 
centrality (logged) 
Degree centrality measures for directors were calculated by flattening the 
bimodal data to create director-director networks for each year. Two directors 




Eigenvector centrality measures for directors were calculated by flattening the 
bimodal data to create director-director networks for each year. Two directors 
are linked if they serve on the same board. 
# of non-overlapping 
boards served on by 
peer directors (logged) 
For the measure of peer director reach, we calculated the number of 
non-overlapping boards each director’s peer directors sat on for each year, 
excluding any boards the focal director also sat on. We added 1 to this value 
before logging. 
Number of board seats 
held by director 
The number of board seats held by the director in the given year. 
Joined board next 
year? 
Coded 1 if a director joined a new S&P 1500 board in the following calendar 
year. 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Years since 1997 6.10 3.75           
2. Age 59.82 8.62 0.09 
    3. Age
2
/100 36.53 10.31 0.09 1.00 
   4. Maximum number of employees (logged) 3.97 0.69 -0.01 0.03 0.02 
  5. Maximum annual return 0.13 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 
 6. Female director? (1 = yes) 0.11 0.31 0.05 -0.18 -0.18 0.07 0.00 
7. Minority director? (1 = yes) 0.08 0.27 0.05 -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.01 
8. Social elite director? (1 = yes) 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 
9. Corporate executive? (1 = yes) 0.23 0.42 -0.08 -0.26 -0.26 0.02 0.01 
10. Director degree centrality (logged) 1.08 0.20 -0.07 0.08 0.06 0.49 0.14 
11. Director eigenvector centrality × 100 0.23 1.05 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.03 
12. # of boards with peer directors (logged) 0.80 0.35 -0.11 0.03 0.02 0.60 0.10 
13. Number of board seats held by director* 1.29 0.58 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.38 0.18 
14. Joined new board next year? (1 = yes) 0.06 0.24 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.02 
 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
7. Minority director? (1 = yes) 0.08               
8. Social elite director? (1 = yes) -0.17 -0.14             
9. Corporate executive? (1 = yes) -0.16 -0.10 0.01           
10. Director degree centrality 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.03         
11. Director eigenvector centrality 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.33       
12. # of boards with peer directors (logged) 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.72 0.28     
13. Number of board seats held by director* 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.84 0.21 0.62   
14. Joined new board next year? (1 = yes) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.09 
 
NOTE—* Number of board seats coded as 3 for three or more boards. 
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TABLE 6 
Logistic regression coefficients for log-odds of director  
gaining a new board appointment in next year 
 
  
DV = join board next year 
 
 
DV = join 
survivor panel 
board 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Years since 1997 -0.190 0.188 0.167 -1.141** 
  (-0.92) (1.01) (0.83) (-2.94) 
Age 0.341*** 0.428*** 0.405*** 0.466*** 
  (7.37) (9.95) (8.79) (5.49) 
Age
2
/100 -0.328*** -0.396*** -0.376*** -0.462*** 
  (-8.15) (-10.62) (-9.39) (-6.14) 
Maximum number of employees (logged) 0.112* 0.683*** 0.594*** -0.027 
  (2.01) (16.73) (13.54) (-0.31) 
Maximum annual return 0.069 0.187*** 0.171*** 0.035 
  (1.30) (3.97) (3.35) (0.39) 
Female director -0.024   0.075 0.140 
  (-0.26)   (0.81) (1.05) 
Minority director 0.382***   0.500*** 0.645*** 
  (3.86)   (5.05) (4.90) 
Social elite director 0.284***   0.412*** 0.128 
  (4.01)   (5.84) (1.16) 
Corporate executive -0.177**   -0.071 0.156 
  (-2.75)   (-1.11) (1.63) 
Director degree centrality (logged) -1.470***     -1.175* 
  (-5.09)     (-2.54) 
Director eigenvector centrality 0.281     -3.870 
  (0.12)     (-0.93) 
# of boards served by peer directors (logged) 1.466***     2.217*** 
  (11.67)     (10.59) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=2) 0.586***     0.368* 
  (6.16)     (2.46) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=3 or more) 0.765***     0.468* 
  (5.15)     (2.02) 
(Years since 1997) x         
Age 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.035** 
  (0.77) (-0.60) (-0.22) (2.58) 
Age
2
/100 -0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.029* 
  (-0.75) (0.48) (0.07) (-2.45) 
Maximum number of employees (logged) 0.006 -0.030*** -0.037*** 0.036** 
  (0.82) (-5.29) (-5.90) (2.92) 
Maximum annual return -0.002 -0.013* -0.013* -0.004 
 66  
  (-0.28) (-2.25) (-2.11) (-0.34) 
Female director 0.012   0.001 -0.008 
  (0.94)   (0.07) (-0.44) 
Minority director -0.022   -0.034* -0.035 
  (-1.63)   (-2.54) (-1.87) 
Social elite director -0.013   -0.023* -0.009 
  (-1.24)   (-2.23) (-0.55) 
Corporate executive 0.021*   0.010 0.026 
  (2.16)   (1.03) (1.83) 
Director degree centrality (logged) 0.012     0.043 
  (0.25)     (0.58) 
Director eigenvector centrality -0.383     -0.529 
  (-0.86)     (-0.65) 
# of boards served by peer directors (logged) -0.049*     -0.075* 
  (-2.54)     (-2.36) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=2) -0.048**     -0.042 
  (-3.23)     (-1.80) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=3 or 
more) -0.097***     -0.107** 
  (-4.02)     (-2.83) 
 
NOTE—Year coefficients not shown. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
 
 
